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The Mental Capacity Act




The Mental Capacity Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 17 June 2004,2 and
received the Royal Assent on 7 April 2005.
The Act, which has been fifteen years in gestation and involved an extensive consultation process,3
abolishes the existing Court of Protection, and replaces it with a new court, also to be known as
the Court of Protection, which will have jurisdiction to deal with all areas of decision-making for
people who lack capacity. Thus, it will combine the personal welfare and healthcare jurisdiction
currently exercised by the Family Division with the property and financial decision-making
jurisdiction of the present Court of Protection. The new court will be regional, served by a
centralised administration office and registry.
It is important for people with disputes or problems to have access to the most effective means of
resolving them, and in many cases the existing health and social welfare mechanisms, mediation or
discussion will be sufficient. Although no one will be compelled to mediate before going to court,
the current policy is that the new court should be the last resort for the resolution of complex or
particularly sensitive cases, or when other forms of dispute resolution have been tried without
success.
1 Master of the Court of Protection. This article is an
amended version of a paper presented at the North
East Mental Health Law Conference in November
2004. It has been updated at proof-reading stage to
reflect the fact that on 7th April 2005 the Mental
Capacity Bill received the Royal Assent.
2 The Bill was re-published with amendments on 4
November 2004, 15 December 2004 and 8 February
2005. 
3 In 1989 the Law Commission embarked on an
“investigation into the adequacy of legal and other
procedures for decision-making on behalf of mentally
incapacitated adults”. It published four consultation
papers – An Overview (1991), A New Jurisdiction
(1993), Medical Treatment and Research (1993), and
Public Law Protection (1993) – before producing its
final report, Law Com. No. 231, Mental Incapacity,
on 1 March 1995, which contained a draft Mental
Incapacity Bill. The Lord Chancellor’s Department
issued a further consultation paper, Who Decides?
followed by its own report, Making Decisions (1999).
In June 2003 the Lord Chancellor’s Department (then
recently renamed the Department for Constitutional
Affairs) issued a draft Mental Incapacity Bill, which
was subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny by a joint
committee of members of the House of Commons and
the House of Lords. The Joint Scrutiny Committee
reported on 28 November 2003,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt/jtdmi.htm
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The court’s clientele
The Court of Protection is unique. It is the only specialised court of its kind in the world, and is
eyed with envy by most other jurisdictions. Its origins go back to at least the second half of the
thirteenth century, when the crown assumed responsibility for the estates of lunatics and idiots,
and this jurisdiction was certainly in place by 1324, when the Statute de Praerogativa Regis
confirmed its continuation.
The court’s current clientele fall into four main constituent groups:
 people with psychiatric illnesses, such as schizophrenia or bipolar affective disorder.
 people with learning difficulties or intellectual disabilities.
 the elderly mentally infirm, mainly suffering from Alzheimer’s disease or multi-infarct
dementia; and 
 people who have acquired brain damage as a result of an accident, assault, or clinical negligence,
and have been awarded compensation for their personal injuries.
It may come as a surprise to note that the present court has comparatively little involvement with
the mainstream mentally ill or people with learning difficulties, the two constituent groups for
whom it was originally created. Most of the court’s time is spent on matters relating to elderly
patients or people with damages awards, principally because these generally tend to be the more
complex, higher value cases. The court takes on about 400 new personal injury and clinical
negligence cases each year. The average award for a road traffic accident is in the region of
£900,000. The average award in a clinical negligence case is about £2,500,000, and the largest award
the court is currently handling is £12,000,000.4 I anticipate that the new court, with its jurisdiction
embracing healthcare and personal welfare decision-making, as well as decisions on property and
financial matters, will involve a re-alignment in terms of meeting the needs of all four groups.
Children
The original intention was that the legislation would only involve adults who lack capacity, as does
the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. Section 2(5) of the Act still states that no powers
under the Act are to be exercised in relation to a person under 16. However, approximately 70%
of the clinical negligence cases the present court deals with result from perinatal injuries, and often
the patients are under 16. Accordingly, section 18(3) provides that, as far as property and financial
affairs are concerned, the powers under the Act may be exercised even though the person
concerned has not reached 16, if the court considers it likely that they will still lack capacity to
make decisions in respect of such matters when they reach 18. The converse of this is that the
Family Division will retain its jurisdiction to make healthcare decisions on behalf of children, as
it did recently, for example, in the two cases involving babies, Charlotte Wyatt in Portsmouth, and
4 Parkin v. Bromley Hospitals NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ. 478. Kerstin Parkin was born in 1968. She and her
husband, Mark, were world-class Latin American dance champions. She suffered profound brain damage following a
cardiac arrest whilst in labour at Farnborough Hospital, Orpington, on 26 November 1996. The total compensation
awarded was £12,000,000, of which £7,000,000 was received as a lump sum, and the remaining £5,000,000 was used
to fund an annuity (known as a “structured settlement”), yielding an index-linked income of £250,000 a year for the rest
of her life. 
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Luke Winston-Jones at Alder Hey.5 Section 21 provides for the transfer of proceedings to the court
best suited to deal with the particular issues involved. So, for example, it may be more appropriate
for the Court of Protection to deal with a case involving a seventeen-year-old who lacks capacity,
since any order under the Children Act 1989 would expire on the child’s eighteenth birthday, at
the latest.
The principles
Before I comment on the expanded role of the new Court of Protection, I think it is important to
consider the basis on which the court will make its decisions in future. Any legislation on mental
incapacity involves striking a balance between two extremely important values: the value we place
on the freedom of individuals to make their own choices about how they live their lives (autonomy
or self-determination), and the value we place on promoting their well-being (paternalism or
protection). 
Benjamin Disraeli once said, in the context of the repeal of the Corn Laws, that “protection is not
only dead, but damned.” The Mental Capacity Act doesn’t go quite that far, but it certainly gives
autonomy and self-determination the upper hand, and almost grudgingly concedes that protection
and paternalism have a subordinate role to play, once it is established that a person lacks the
capacity to make a particular decision. In this respect the Act endorses the views of the liberal
school of philosophy, of which the leading British exponent was Disraeli’s contemporary, John
Stuart Mill (1806–1873). In his essay On Liberty, first published in 1859, Mill said:6
“The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely
the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the
means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public
opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because
it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of
others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with
him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him
or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it
is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the
conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”
If you read them in sequence, the principles in section 1 of the Mental Capacity Act form a
flowchart or blueprint of how in future all of us – parents, carers, doctors, lawyers, social workers,
and the court itself – should deal with people who are unable to make decisions for themselves in
5 Charlotte Wyatt (Mr Justice Hedley, 8 October 2004),
Luke Winston-Jones (Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, 22
October 2004).
6 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Penguin Classics, pages
68 and 69. Mill suffered from several nervous
breakdowns and, although he was never the subject of
a commission de lunatico inquirendo, he reserved his
fiercest invective for a description of such proceedings:
ibid, page 134.
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relation to a particular matter at a particular time because of an impairment of, or a disturbance
in the functioning of, their mind or brain.
We must start by assuming that they are entirely autonomous, regardless, at this stage, of whether
they are actually capable of making the decision in question.7
We must take all practicable steps to help them make the decision that needs to be made.8 This
involves providing information relevant to that decision, including information about the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of deciding one way or another, or not deciding at all.9 It also
involves taking all practicable steps to help them communicate their decision, whether by speech,
sign language, or any other means.10
Even though they may be suffering from a condition that restricts their ability to govern their life
and make independent choices, as long as they have the basic ability to consider the options and
make choices, we must not intervene against their will. By intervening against their will, even for
their own good, we show less respect for them than if we had allowed them to go ahead and make
a mistake. This lack of inter-personal respect is potentially a more serious infringement of their
rights and freedom of action than allowing them to make an unwise decision.11
A paternalistic intervention is only justified when all practicable steps to help a person make a
decision have been taken without success, and it is established that they do not have the basic ability
to consider options and make choices. And such an intervention must be in their best interests.12
The idea of “best interests” is not the traditional one that parents, carers, doctors and social workers
are used to. It is heavily permeated by the principle of “substituted judgment”, which in recent
years, particularly in the United States, has been identified as a preferred alternative to best interests
as the standard for substitute decision-making.13 It is a mandatory requirement, so far as is
reasonably ascertainable, to consider the person’s past and present wishes and feelings, the beliefs
and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, and the other factors that
he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.14 Similar requirements are expected when
consulting others as to what would be in a person’s best interests.15
Even then, before intervening in a person’s best interests, we must explore other ways of
overcoming the particular problem, and, where feasible, choose the option that restricts the
individual’s autonomy and freedom of action to the least extent.16 I shall be returning to this idea
of “the least restrictive alternative” later, when considering the court’s appointment of deputies.
7 Section 1(2): “A person must be assumed to have
capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity.”
8 Section 1(3): “A person is not to be treated as unable to
make a decision unless all practicable steps to help him
do so have been taken without success.”
9 Section 3(3).
10 Section 3(1)(d).
11 Section 1(4): “A person is not to be treated as unable to
make a decision merely because he makes an unwise
decision.”
12 Section 1(5): “An act done, or decision made, under
this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks
capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests.”
13 The modern literature on capacity generally considers
that the origin of the doctrine of “substituted
judgment” was the decision of Lord Chancellor Eldon
in Ex parte Whitbread, In the matter of Hinde, a
lunatic (1816) 2 Mer. 99, in which an allowance or
gift was made to a member of the family who was not
dependent upon the lunatic. The present Court of
Protection exercises substituted judgment when
authorising the execution of a statutory will on behalf
of a patient pursuant to the Mental Health Act 1983,
s 99(1)(e): see Re D(J) [1982] 2 All ER 37.
14 Section 4(6).
15 Section 4(7).
16 Section 1(6): “Before the act is done, or the decision is
made, regard must be had to whether the purpose for
which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a
way that is less restrictive of the person’s rights and
freedom of action.”
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During the Bill’s second reading in the House of Lords on 10 January 2005, the Rt. Rev Dr Peter
Selby, Bishop of Worcester, said:17
“Clause 1 contains a statement about a vision of humanity and how humanity is to be regarded.
I hope children in generations to come will study that as one of the clearest and most eloquent
expressions of what we think a human being is and how a human being is to be treated. .... 
I renew my congratulations to those who brought the Bill forward and to all those who worked
to make it what it is. I believe that it states what is fundamentally right. In the course of
Committee we shall no doubt improve and tighten some of the wording, but we shall never take
away the powerful and eloquent statement in Clause 1. That should underlie our treatment of
one another in all circumstances and for all purposes.”
The new Court of Protection
The new Court of Protection will be a superior court of record, as distinct from the present court
which is an office of the Supreme Court.18 It will be able to sit at any place in England and Wales,
on any day, and at any time.19 Like the High Court, it will be able to respond appropriately to
emergency cases that need to be heard urgently.20 If need be, part of a hearing can be conducted
outside a conventional courtroom, for example in hospital, or at the home or bedside of the
person who lacks capacity. 
At this stage, it is not certain where the more formal, permanent venues will be. Since 1 October
2001 the present court has had a regional centre at Preston, where District Judge Gordon Ashton
sits as a Deputy Master and deals with Court of Protection matters most Thursdays, and we will
build on this experience when expanding the court’s presence nationwide. Technology, such as e-
mail links, electronic case management systems and video-conferencing facilities, will play a pivotal
role.
The new court will have a central office and registry at a place appointed by the Lord Chancellor.21
We expect the central administration to be based in London, mainly because this is where the
expertise currently is, in terms of the Family Division, and the existing Court of Protection and
Public Guardianship Office. However, this will need to be considered further in the light of two
recent reviews: Sir Michael Lyons’ review of public sector relocation, Well placed to deliver? –
Shaping the pattern of Government Service (March 2004),22 and Sir Peter Gershon’s review, Releasing
resources to the front line: Independent Review of Public sector Efficiency (July 2004).23
The judges of the new Court of Protection will be nominated from various levels of the judiciary,
ranging from the President of the Family Division and the Vice-Chancellor, through puisne judges
17 Hansard, vol 668, no 18, pages 54 and 55.
18 Section 45(1) and (6).
19 Section 45(4).
20 Section 48 confers an emergency jurisdiction on the
court to make interim orders and directions where there
is reason to believe that a person lacks capacity, and it
is in their best interests to make the order or give the
directions without delay.
21 Section 45(4). Under the proposals in the
Constitutional Reform Bill, the functions of the Lord
Chancellor under the Mental Capacity Bill will
become the responsibility of the Lord Chief Justice,
either after consultation with, or with the concurrence
of, the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs or
the Lord Chancellor.
22 The text is available online at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/consultations_and_legislation/lyons/cons
ult_lyons_index.cfm
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from all three divisions of the High Court,24 to circuit judges and district judges.25 I imagine that
the jurisdiction will be confined, initially at least, to two or three judges per circuit, and specific
individuals will be named for the purpose, rather than a generic class of judiciary. At present,
appeals and references can be heard by any judge of the Chancery Division or Family Division,
some of whom have had little or no experience, either in practice or on the bench, of matters
involving people who lack capacity.
The new court will have a President and Vice-President, who will be nominated from the two heads
of divisions or from the High Court bench,26 and a Senior Judge, who will be nominated from the
circuit or district bench.27 It has been assumed that the President of the Family Division will also
be the President of the new Court of Protection, though there is no specific requirement that the
same person should hold both offices. It may be advantageous for the independence of the
fledgling court not to be seen as an adjunct to the Family Division. One of the main functions of
the President will be to give directions relating to the practice and procedure of the court.28
Individual cases will be dealt with by a judge at the appropriate level. For example, nominated
district judges will hear cases similar in nature to their existing jurisdiction in family proceedings, or
where local knowledge may be an important factor. Nominated circuit judges will deal with difficult
residence and access disputes, and cases involving complex financial issues. The nominated High
Court judges will deal with more high profile cases, such as those involving end-of-life decisions.
There is a right of appeal to a higher judge of the Court of Protection and thereafter, for cases
involving important points of law, practice or procedure, to the Court of Appeal.29
In connection with its jurisdiction, the new court will have the same powers, rights, privileges and
authority as the High Court.30 At present, it is unclear whether this provision merely relates to matters
such as evidence, enforcement of orders, and contempt, or whether the new court will have the powers
that the Chancery Division has to make freezing injunctions or search orders in abuse cases.
Section 51 provides that the Lord Chancellor may make rules of court with respect to the practice
and procedure of the court. As the Court of Protection is a relatively small and highly specialised
jurisdiction, no provision has been made for a formal statutory rules committee. However, it is
envisaged that a wide range of stakeholders will be invited to contribute to the process of drawing
up the rules, and that the consultation will take place before the end of 2005, with a view to
publishing the rules by the end of 2006, in readiness for the implementation of the Act in April 2007.
The functions of the new Court of Protection
In brief, the new Court of Protection will be able to:
 make declarations as to whether or not someone has the capacity to make a particular decision;
for example, where professionals disagree on whether someone with learning difficulties has the
capacity to refuse major heart surgery;31
24 It was originally intended that the nominated High
Court judges would come from either the Family
Division or the Chancery Division. However, this has
been extended to all three divisions because of the
expertise within the Queen’s Bench Division in







31 Section 15(1). It is likely that these declarations will be
dealt with by a circuit judge, or, if the issues are
particularly complex, by a High Court judge.
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 make declarations as to the lawfulness or otherwise or any act done, or yet to be done, in
relation to a person.32
 make single, one-off orders; for example, the sale of a house and the investment of the
proceeds of sale.33
 appoint a deputy to make decisions in relation to the matter or matters in which a person lacks
the capacity to make a decision.34
 resolve various issues involving lasting powers of attorney.35
 make a declaration as to whether an advance decision to refuse treatment exists, is valid, or is
applicable to a particular treatment.36
The power to make declarations is similar to, though slightly wider than, the present declaratory
jurisdiction of the Family Division. I am concerned, however, that the new court may be deluged
with applications to make a definitive decision on capacity, where there is a respectable body of
evidence on either side of the line. Since the decision of the Court of Appeal in the personal injury
case, Masterman-Lister v. Brutton & Co.,37 there has been a steady stream of applications for the
court to decide in cases of borderline capacity to manage property and financial affairs.38 I can also
envisage solicitors coming to the court to declare whether a client has testamentary capacity or the
capacity to make a lasting power of attorney.
Appointing deputies
There is a widespread misunderstanding that deputies appointed by the court will simply be
receivers with a new name. This is not the case at all, and the Act provides that, when deciding
whether it is in a person’s best interests to appoint a deputy, the court should have regard to the
principles that (a) a decision by the court is to be preferred to the appointment of a deputy to make
a decision, and that (b) the powers conferred on a deputy should be as limited in scope and
duration as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances.39
This is a good illustration of the operation of the principle of the least restrictive alternative, which
requires the existence of alternative courses of action to be investigated and compared, and the
preferred course of action to be the one that achieves the desired objective in a manner that
interferes least with the rights and freedom of action of the person concerned. The modern origin
of this principle is generally acknowledged to be the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Shelton v. Tucker (1960),40 in which the court said:
“In a series of decisions this court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
32 Section 15(1)(c).
33 Section 16(2)(a). It is anticipated that decisions of this
kind will be made at district judge level.
34 Section 16(2)(b).
35 Sections 22 and 23. These are likely to be dealt with by
a judge at district bench level.
36 Section 26(4).
37 Masterman-Lister v. Brutton & Co. [2003] 3 All ER
162. The decision of Mr Justice Wright, at first
instance, is reported at [2002] Lloyds Rep Med 239.
38 Capacity is now also raised more frequently in personal
injury proceedings. See, for example, the judgment of
Mrs Justice Cox in Mitchell v Alasia, which was
handed down on 11 January 2005. At paragraph 76
her ladyship decided that Russell Mitchell, now 23, is
currently a patient, but should no longer be a patient in
approximately three years time after intensive
rehabilitation.
39 Section 16(4).
40 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.”
This doctrine was first applied in the context of mental health law in Lessard v. Schmidt (1972)41 by
a Wisconsin district court, which placed the burden of exploring alternatives on the person
recommending full-time involuntary hospitalisation. They have to prove (1) what alternatives are
available; (2) what alternatives they investigated; and (3) why the investigated alternatives were
considered unsuitable. 
In the United States the principle of the least restrictive alternative also applies to adult
guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, which are broadly similar to the appointment of a
receiver under the Mental Health Act 1983. The Uniform Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act, which was finalised for adoption by states in 1982, introduced the concept of a
“limited guardianship” in response to a call for more sensitive procedures, and for appointments
to be fashioned so that the authority of the protector would only intrude on the liberties and
prerogatives of the protected person to a degree that was absolutely necessary. 
The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act 1982 was replaced by a new Act in
1997, which provides that guardianship should be viewed as a last resort, that limited
guardianships should be used whenever possible, and that the guardian or conservator should
always consult with the ward or protected person, to the maximum extent feasible, when making
decisions.42
The National College of Probate Judges issues guidance for its judges: the National Probate Court
Standards (1993).43 Standard 3.3.10, which is headed “Less Intrusive Alternatives”, states as
follows:
(a) The probate court should find that no less intrusive alternatives exist before the
appointment of a guardian.
(b) The court should always consider, and utilize, where appropriate, limited guardianships.
(c) In the absence of governing statutes, the court, taking into account the wishes of the
respondent, should use its inherent or equity powers to limit the scope of and tailor the
guardianship order to the particular needs, functional capabilities, and limitations of the
respondent.
(d) The court should maximize co-ordination and co-operation with social service agencies in
order to find alternatives to guardianships or to support limited guardianships.
It is likely that the new Court of Protection will apply similar criteria when deciding whether or
not to appoint a deputy.
41 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp.1078 (E.D.Wis.1972).
42 See text at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s
/ugppa97.htm See, in particular, section 311.
43 See text at
http://www.probatect.org/ohioprobatecourts/pdf
/national_probate_standards.pdf
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Applications to the court
The present Court of Protection has rules as to who may make an application, as of right, and who
needs to obtain leave to make an application, but these are contained in secondary legislation.44
The Act will make similar provisions within the primary legislation.45 As a general rule, the court’s
permission will need to be obtained before an application can be made, but some categories of
person can apply as or right, without the need to obtain permission. These are:
 a person who lacks, or is alleged to lack, capacity.
 if that person is under 18, anyone with parental responsibility for him or her.
 the donor or donee of a lasting power of attorney.
 a deputy appointed by the court; or
 any person named in an existing order of the court, if the application relates to that order.
Interestingly, this list does not include the Public Guardian, the Official Solicitor,46 health
authorities, social services, the independent consultee service, and, in many cases, the next-of-kin
or close family members. They will need to obtain the court’s permission before they can make an
application, and I am concerned that, particularly in abuse cases, there may be satellite litigation as
to whether an organisation has sufficient standing to make an application. When deciding whether
to grant permission, the court is required to have regard to:47
 the applicant’s connection with the person.
 the reasons for the application.
 the benefit to the person of any proposed order or direction, and
 whether that benefit can be achieved in any other way.
The relationship between the court and the Office of the Public Guardian
At present, the Public Guardianship Office (PGO) operates as the administrative or executive arm
of the Court of Protection, and the two organisations are accommodated in the same building,
Archway Tower, 2 Junction Road, London N19 5SZ. The PGO is an executive agency of the
Department for Constitutional Affairs, and its existence is not formally recognised in any statute.
The Act provides for the creation of a new, statutory office-holder to be known as the Public
Guardian,48 and confers on him or her various functions, such as:
 establishing and maintaining a register of lasting powers of attorney.
 establishing and maintaining a register of orders appointing deputies (though not a register of
the one-off decisions of the court, which, in accordance with clause 16(4)(a) of the Act are to
be preferred to the appointment of a deputy).
 supervising deputies appointed by the court.
44 For example, rule 18 of the Court of Protection Rules
2001 (SI 2001/824), which sets out the persons who
are entitled to apply for a statutory will, and rule 21 of
the Court of Protection (Enduring Powers of Attorney)
Rules 2001 (SI 2001/825)
45 Section 50(1).
46 Section 50(2) provides that the Court of Protection
Rules can specify others who can apply to the court
without permission, and it is probable that they will
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 directing Court of Protection Visitors to make visits.
 receiving security.
 receiving reports from donees of lasting powers of attorney and deputies.
 reporting to the court on such matters as the court requires.
 dealing with representations and complaints about attorneys or deputies.
Although there is provision for the Lord Chancellor to make regulations conferring additional
functions on the Public Guardian, the list of functions conferred by the Act does not expressly
include the PGO’s present functions of processing originating applications to the court, and acting
as the receiver of last resort.
So, it is envisaged that in future there will be two distinct organisations, of broadly similar size, in
separate offices, and that the court will have an administrative staff as well as members of the
judiciary. This is designed to create a clearer and sharper distinction between the work of the new
Court of Protection and the Office of the Public Guardian. In practical and change management
terms, there is a need to disentangle the close relationship that currently exists between the Court
of Protection and the PGO in a way that achieves a proper distinction between the two
organisations, whilst retaining the positive aspects of the present close working arrangements.
Preliminary costings
It is possible that an increased awareness of capacity issues during the passage of the Bill and in the
lead up to and implementation of the Act will result in a higher number of cases than usual. I have
seen somewhere that the cost of establishing the new Court of Protection and the Office of the
Public Guardian will be £4,700,000 for the set-up costs prior to implementation, and that the
annual running costs will be £8,600,000 thereafter. The annual running costs have been calculated
on the basis that the number of health and welfare cases, which currently go to the High Court,
but in future will go to the new Court of Protection, will double to 200, and that of the estimated
1,200,000 people who might have recourse to the Bill because they lack capacity, 1.5% will seek
and receive legal advice and assistance each year.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I must apologise for not being able to be more informative and precise about the
new court and its expanded role. For those of you who have studied the Mental Capacity Act, 
I will have told you nothing you didn’t know already. So far, the main focus of the Department for
Constitutional Affairs has been to ensure the safe passage of the Bill, make positive messages
known, rebut inaccuracies, and engage groups with particular concerns. The finer points of detail
relating to the new jurisdiction will need to be considered after the Act has been passed and during
the two years’ lead-up to its implementation.
